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ABSTRACT 
This research underscores the debates on amnesty versus victims’ rights as confronted by States undergoing the 
process of transitional justice in the aftermath of armed conflicts. The incidences of non-international armed 
conflicts in recent decades have given rise to numerous strategies for attaining peace in fractured societies. The 
nature of the peace agreement adopted and the transitional justice institutions established vary according to a 
great number of factors, including the type of conflict conducted and its participants, perceptions of 
victimisation, as well as expectations of reconciliation among former opponents.  Amnesty has been the most 
popular transitional justice mechanism for the past four decades, particularly in the context of civil war. States 
justify the use of amnesties by claiming that they are successful in enticing armed actors to demobilise, enter 
negotiations, and sign on to peace agreements, and are thus an important tool to secure peace. Many legal 
commentators, human rights activists and victims of violent conflicts on the other hand, have heavily criticised 
the grant of amnesty on legal, ethical, and moral grounds, maintaining that victims’ rights to justice is a 
necessary precursor to peace, and without it, peace would merely be a brief interlude between conflicts. It has 
been observed that, there are moral and ethical considerations militating against prosecutions where they would 
likely lead to political instability and further loss of life, hence the dependency on amnesty. This work 
recommends that amnesty laws should provide for adequate reparation packages, and be enacted through 
democratic procedures in order to ensure that the victims’ affected by the crimes have a role to play in 
determining the country’s response in the aftermath of atrocities following violent conflict, hence promoting a 
sense of moral justification, and desire for the grant of amnesty by the victims. 
Keywords: Transitional Justice, Amnesty, Victims, Post Conflict 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
All over the world, conflicts and atrocities continue to tear States and human lives apart and have raged 
through centuries, and are up to this day still raging mainly due to struggle for power, poverty, difference in 
ethnicity or religion and resource control.
1
  Currently today there are approximately 65 major conflicts around 
the world. Even so, well over 2 billion persons are resident of war-torn countries and are experiencing the 
immediate impact of armed hostilities as victims.2  Although interstate struggles have seen recent decline, today 
the majority of conflicts are of a non-international character amongst non-state armed groups and other non-state 
actors against democratic States and group, hence compromising peace, security and development.  
Presently, the civilian population makes up for the highest number of victims affected by violent conflicts in 
most war-torn African States notably Burundi, Mozambique and Somalia, enduring limitless suffering as well as 
trauma. As such, victims created by violent conflict varies, mostly they consist of those tortured, the dead, raped 
victims, captured victims, those amputated by vicious rebels and persons whose loved one’s have been lost to the 
war. It is worthy to note that victims typically occupy a central position and place in all reconciliation processes 
for societies recovering from decades of armed conflict. It is worthy to note that the acts of victimization extends 
beyond mere physical or bodily harm to include the loss of self-worth, displacement from families and loved 
ones, extermination of one’s community and destruction of property. Families of individual victims who have 
been wronged in violent conflicts have craved for what they believed would be satisfaction through justice.
3
   
However, the interplay of divergent political interest in post-conflict settings presents difficult choices 
for peace building and restoration processes in failed States. Following the gradual recovery process by States in 
an aftermath of hostilities, dictatorship rule, and situations of ethnic cleansing, a central issue always comes to 
bear, which must be addressed that is, what ways would be most effective to address heinous crimes carried out 
                                                           
1  Isaksson, Josefine., Preventing Future Human Rights Violations - Truth Commissions or Tribunals? Lund university, Lund 
Sweden. October 2009.  
2 See, Wars In The World, list of ongoing conflicts, http://www.warsintheworld.com/?page=static1258254223, last visited 7th 
September, 2015 
3 Luc Huyse, Reconciliation After Violent Conflict A Handbook, Stockholm Sweden: Bulls Tryckeri Press, 2003      p. 54 
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by violators before the restoration of peace as well as democracy in a war-torn region. As noted by Kritz,
1
 issues 
of accountability, on the events, happenings and experiences of victims in war-torn States are a central focus of 
core International Institutions, furthermore obtaining legal redress for the sufferings as well as enhancing 
harmonious reunion amongst all classes of persons affected during the conflict would be contributory factors 
towards the maintenance of lasting peace within the region. Nonetheless, the degree of political uncertainty that 
defines most African peace process is one of such that the upmost supporter of prosecution acknowledges the 
need to guard against an outbreak of renewed violence arising from initiation of legal proceedings against 
perpetrators.    
The promotion of peace making, reparation as well as legal redress following violent clashes and 
hostilities in war-torn States could be a daunting and daring process, in most cases taking an age long period to 
attain. However, where States fail to effectively look into these cases of humanitarian wrongs, a resurgence of 
protests by affected victims or outburst of widespread violence are often experienced. It is as a result of the 
forgoing that upmost attention and resources are employed by States in a bid to achieve effective governance, 
amity and harmony within the country. Transitional justice generally entails or involves measures of 
acknowledgement, prosecution, compensation as well as forgiveness, all of which are vital for States 
reconstruction following violent hostilities.
2
 Transitional Justice (TJ) remains the focal point of immerse concern 
for war-torn communities. As a discipline, the subject concerns itself more on legal redress either for States 
recovering from violent conflicts or undergoing violent conflict. The process of transitional justice involves a 
number of procedures which could be legal or of a non-legal approach. Close indicators of its achievement are 
marked by its ability to bestour true reconciliation and promotion of justice as well as democratic processes 
within divided societies. Instances abound to show that the pursuit of justice often inhibits lenient peace efforts.     
Whilst transitional justice seeks to ensure peace and justice all together, forgoing criminal trials and acts 
of retribution would sometimes appear needful in order to promote a bloodless transition. Hence, the grant of 
amnesty to former rebel groups exists as an imperative tool of immunity from criminal trials. Regardless, 
whether the avoidance of criminal trials contributes to bringing back together divided societies would depend on 
the framework of this discipline and the peculiarity of each conflict.
3
  In recent times, the discipline has played a 
central role in bringing back together war torn societies ravished by violent and heinous conflicts such as 
Uganda, South Africa, and Rwanda. 
One of the intricate mechanisms of transitional justice that is so closely associated with the concept 
itself is the issue of amnesty.  Generally, amnesty has been employed by a number of countries as a 
governmental instrument of reunion and compromise following past abuses or massive atrocities and civil war. It 
aids to guarantee peaceful and even governmental transitions in hostile conditions. Jon Elster,
4
 dates the 
historical development of the concept of amnesty to the age-old Athenian States, where it was most employed to 
broker peace amongst warring parties. Indeed, politicians in many war torn countries often perceived amnesties a 
sacrifice that must be endured, a standpoint that has always been voiced by local community groups affected by 
the conflict and also by International peace activists engaged in peace making or restoring peaceful transition.5   
On the other hand, advancement in International criminal law has triggered severe criticisms against the 
continuous use of amnesty by States. For instance, advocate of criminal trials vehemently maintain that peculiar 
categories of atrocities perpetuated in times of internal conflicts be excluded from an amnesty process; and that 
true peace cannot be achieved without recourse to justice as the award of amnesty emboldens impunity for the 
perpetrators and finally that the earnest desire of victims is criminal trials of aggressors who victimized them.  
The sad truth is that there exist no clearly defined or definite International law treaty that has categorically 
outlawed the grant, use or resort to amnesty, as a result States have repeatedly extended its applicability to a 
variety of crimes.  A classic scenario is the South African amnesty granted during the apartheid transition, which 
covered heinous atrocities. Similarly, individuals championing the calls for amnesty elimination would agree that 
such calls are limited to cases of serious violations of humanitarian laws. More so, criminal trials should focus 
on only a certain category of persons such as rebel commanders under whose instructions and command the 
crimes were perpetrated. For instance, children are generally recognized to be precluded from prosecution. As 
                                                           
1 Neil Kritz., ‘‘Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human 
Rights’’ Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 59 No. 4 (1996) 127-152. 
2 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies, 3 August 2004, New York: United Nations Doc. S/2004/616 (para. 8). 
3 Versen, Anne. Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda: A Report on the Pursuit of Justice in Ongoing Conflict. Roskilde 
University, Roskilde Denmark. 2009.  
4
 Elster, Jon. ‘’A Case Study of Transitional Justice. Athens in 411 and 403 B.C,’’ In Lukas H. Meyer, (ed) 
Justice in Time: Responding to Historical Injustice; Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Press, 2004.  223-
238.    
5 L. Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008. 
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such the emphasis here is that there is no common legal accord outlawing amnesty and offenders who committed 
lesser crimes will be granted amnesty. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Critics of Transitional justice abounds, from both within and outside the discipline. Justice Goldstone 
Richard,
1
 notes that "full justice consists of the trial of the, perpetrator and, if found guilty, adequate 
punishment." Hence justice as defined by Justice Goldstone Richard refers to justice as being retributive justice.
 2
  
Mallinder, however argues that justice can in like manner take the form of restorative justice. It is paramount to 
note that denial of justice and its associated effect depends in large part on how justice is defined. Chief Justice 
Bart Katureebe,
3
 a Ugandan jurist of remarkable intellectual prowess offers great insight into the amnesty versus 
victims’ rights debate in the recent case of Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo, where he arrived at the conclusion that 
there is no uniform standard or practice in respect of amnesties and as such each country determines the 
approach it should take in its applicability to address its own unique conflict situation. Mani,4 writing on beyond 
retribution suggests that peace building through amnesty cannot achieve or redress the actual needs of victims of 
conflict. Peace activists’ have more often centred on the reconstruction of institutions of the state as against 
looking into questions of victims’ rights to justice, which more often underscore conflicts in several countries. 
Mark Freeman’s work on “Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice”,
5
 is a welcome addition to the 
academic field. What makes his argument so persuasive is that he effectively agrees with those who object to 
amnesty’s use.  He argues that the default position should always be to pursue justice. Freeman stresses further 
that history is full of bad models of amnesty. In his own words, “in extreme circumstances and only in such 
extreme circumstances, amnesty may be a necessary evil to achieve peace and security, and it should not be 
taken off the policy table.”  He contends that amnesty should be considered a “last recourse,” and States should 
only pursue this strategy if specific criteria are met.  Specifically, the situation must be urgent and grave, and all 
other options must have been exhausted, including other clemency options short of amnesty. 
Kritz,
6
 an American scholar also wrote on transitional Justice generally. A unique aspect of his work is 
that he views victims’ rights to justice as a means of healing traumas and emotional wounds in order to promote 
community reconciliation and peace.  The scholar stressed that this process is essential for both victims and 
perpetrators of past abuse to allow for a sense of justice and cleansing. Politically, the failure to ensure legal 
redress for victims in post-conflict societies may weaken the Supreme authority of the new government, inciting 
renewed conflict in a society emerging from violence and civil strife. Other scholars and commentators who 
have also made useful contributions to transitional justice jurisprudence generally include, Snyder and 
Vinjamuri7 who cite the most recent international criminal tribunals as having “utterly failed to deter subsequent 
abuses in the former Yugoslavia and Central Africa,” and instead draw on case studies in El Salvador and 
Mozambique, among others, to argue for the important effectiveness of amnesties. They argue that truth 
commissions are only successful in ending atrocities when combined with amnesties (South Africa experience), 
and contrary to proponents of justice, advance the view that de facto amnesties have been equally successful 
when accompanied by political reform strategies (Namibia experience). 
Kofi Annan,
8
 erstwhile UN
 
Secretary-General stated thus: 
“We should know that there cannot be real peace without justice, yet the relentless 
pursuit of justice may sometimes be an obstacle to peace. If we insist, at all times and in 
all places, on punishing those who are guilty of extreme violations of human rights, it 
may be difficult or even impossible to stop the bloodshed and save innocent civilians. If 
we always and everywhere insist on uncompromising standards of justice, a delicate 
peace may not survive. But equally, if we ignore the demands of justice simply to secure 
                                                           
1 Erstwhile chief prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR 
2 R. C. Slye., “The legitimacy of amnesties under international law and general principles of Anglo-American law: Is a 
legitimate amnesty possible?”. Virginia Journal of International Law, 43(1) (2002) p. 173-247. 
3  See, Judgement of the Supreme Court of Uganda delivered on April 8, 2015 in the recent case of  Uganda v. Thomas 
Kwoyelo, Constitutional Appeal No. 01 of 2012,http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/uganda-v.-kwoyelo-
judgment, last visited 17th September, 2015 
4  Rama Mani., Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002 p. 127-133. 
5 Freeman, Mark., Necessary Evils. Amnesties and the search for justice. New York, Cambridge university press 2009. p. 29. 
6 Kritz, Op. Cit. p. 127-152. 
7  Snyder, Jack., Leslie Vinjamuri. “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice.” International Security, vol 28. No. 3 (2004) p. 5-44. 
8  Justice and the Rule of Law: the United Nations Role. United Nations Security Council 4833rd meeting agenda held on 
Wednesday, 24 September 2003, 9 a.m. New York S/PV.4833. 
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agreement, the foundations of that agreement will be fragile, and we will set bad 
precedents.” 
Mallinder, 1  acknowledges that amnesties could encourage distrust towards state institutions, 
nonetheless is convience that gains made through prosecution are attainable only when the much needed 
financial capital as well as testimony needed to convict perpetrators are available, and also in circumstances 
where criminal trials does not lead to resurgence of bloodshed. Freeman supports Mallinder stand, arguing 
further that not all amnesties are in opposition or excludes dissuasion, 2  thus amnesties with non-repetitive 
clauses as a criteria to obtaining its gains, would be in line with the goals of dissuasion.    
Slye,
3 
 worries that the repetitive grant of amnesty to perpetrators would definitely lead to an expectant 
culture, by futuristic violators, hence reduce preclusion over forthcoming and subsequent atrocities.  
Ndifon,4 acknowledges that the grant of amnesty takes place in some cases, following violent atrocities 
in war-torn States. The scholar considers it to be a potent tool for effective reconstruction process in divided 
societies and states further that it would be misleading to associate the concept with legal rules. In his view, 
States give priority to the political goal of peace-making, through formal gestures involving “forgetting” which 
they consider to be crucial, thus paving the way for a renewed society. He emphasised that the concept should 
not be equated with the necessary evil doctrine but rather it should be perceived as one which promotes impunity 
within war-torn States recovering from conflict. In addition, the scholar stressed that the concept though globally 
recognized, comes with serious repercussions. More so, the continuous application of the concept by war-torn 
States is in breach of the cardinal Rule of law tenets, hence obstructing democratic principles and values. He 
concludes his remarkable work by advocating for the just punishment of offenders.  
Eberechi,
5
 states that in some cultures, amnesties are a normal response to crimes: “at the heart of the 
jurisprudence of most African conflict resolution mechanisms is the power to grant amnesty to perpetrators of 
crimes, in exchange for their confessions and repentance” In these societies, amnesties might be more beneficial 
for victims than international criminal justice because international criminal justice “evidences a predominance 
of Western-generated theories and absence of non-Western discourse.” Trumbull,
6
  agrees with Eberechi and 
States further that, in these societies, “refusing to recognize amnesties may actually deny victims the opportunity 
to use traditional methods of reconciliation and forgiveness to deal with crimes”.  As maintained by the Acholi 
people in Northern Uganda, justice is meant to be restorative and not vindictive. The apprehension between 
‘western’ and ‘traditional’ models of justice comes from the diverse intent of both, hinged on the criterion of 
punitive justice as against the resolve for restorative justice.
7
  
 
3. AMNESTY VERSUS VICTIMS RIGHTS: CAN A BALANCE BE ACHIEVED  
The amnesty debate is about balancing the political realities needed to achieve peace with the demands 
of victims for justice. However, the absence of an effective framework for the attainment of a balance between 
prosecutions and amnesties is generally the most contentious facet of any transitional justice process. The 
difficulty is often portrayed as an either choice between peace and justice. Activist clamoring for peace maintain 
that it should be obtained no matter what and at any price, conversely, divergent human rights groups, 
institutions and advocates of justice contend that the cannot be lasting peace without recourse to judicial 
measures or pursuit of justice. Advocates of human rights basically circumscribe for justice in situations where 
abuses of human rights have been perpetuated and hold that the strongest starting point for lasting peace is 
securing justice. At variance with this argument are the peace practitioners who perceive justice from the 
perspective of reconciliation, by that, the place more focus and necessity on peace accord between the fractions 
involved in the conflict, in a bid to ending the conflict and preventing renewed violence.  
                                                           
1 Mallinder, Op. Cit. p. 16-17. 
2 Freeman, Op Cit. p..21. 
3  Slye, Ronald C., “Amnesty, truth, an reconciliation: reflections on the South African amnesty process”,, in Truth v. 
Justice.The Morality of Truth Commissions. Rotberg, Robert I. and Thompson, Dennis (ed) Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press (2000). p. 183. 
4 C. Osim Ndifon., “Amnesty And The Obligatio Erga Omnes To Repress Humanitarian Law Violations: Lessons From The 
Sierra Leone Conflict.”  European Scientific Journal, vol. 8, No.14 (2012) p. 18 
5 Eberechi, I. “Who will save these endangered species? Evaluating the implications of the principle of complementarity on 
the traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms.” African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 20(1) (2012) 
p.22-41.  
6
 C.P. Trumbull., “Giving amnesties a second chance.” Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. 25, (2007)         
p. 283-345. 
7 P Hoening., “The dilemma of peace and justice in Northern Uganda.” East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights,  
vol. 338 (2008) 
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Presently, no scholarly findings have proposed a comprehensive and balanced approached  between 
amnesties and victims’ rights to justice following massive humanitarian violations and human rights abuses in 
post conflict societies. However, scholars of international law widely admit on the recognition that the aftermath 
of systematic violations and grave breaches creates a duty on the State to the victims. But in practice, States torn 
by conflict are unwilling or sometimes due to certain cricumstances unable to discharge this duty. They dread 
that simply putting up a case for justice will endanger the unstable and precarious peace process. As a result 
thereof, a State can chose to engage in or turndown prosecution by balancing the rights of victims against other 
paramount concerns, to include peace, reconmcilation and acts in the general interest of the public. One of the 
method that has existed for a long period of time, structured to deal with the past, following authoritarian and 
violent conflict is amnesty. Lisa
1
 opined that although a number of reasons exist for States to enact amnesty 
laws, Heads of State more often than not are confronted with the burden of placing on a balance scale, peace 
deals through the grant of amnesty on the one hand, and justice obtainable by means of criminal procedures.  
Undoubtedly, few national rulers had legitimated the grant of amnesty as a vital tool for the maintenance of 
peace; in these cases, the want of stability simply takes precedence over culpability. This process clearly shows 
that most States believe that a bargain between justice and peace must be made and that the non-prosecutorial 
model which is the crux of amnesty is a tolerable sacrifice that must be made in order to remove authoritarian 
government or end armed conflicts. As asserted by Bassiouni,
 2
  “the price for peace is often justice or a trade off 
between peace and justice”. An evaluation of the legal status of amnesty laws under International law does not 
disclose any universal consensus for its prohibition, and as such, States continue to resort to the use of amnesty 
as a means of resolving dire conflict situations when the need arises. From the perspective of civil right activists 
including sufferer from heinous crimes, use of amnesty in transitional societies is viewed as “having dealings 
with the devil”.
3
  
4. DEBATES ON AMNESTY VERSUS VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN POST CONFLICT SOCIETIES 
 
4.1 Arguments for Prosecution. 
Advocates of criminal prosecutions, mark out a number of morally acceptable and policy rationale to 
champion their stands that transitional societies should conduct criminal trials in an effort to redress the 
aftermath as well as cases of humanitarian abuses. Most outstanding argument of all, in support of the 
prosecutorial model is that it is of great necessity in order to nurture a society founded upon the tenets of the 
Rule of law. The adverse effects of a failure to conduct criminal trials may be the development of a community 
wherein the three tiers of government are grossly undervalued.  
Diane Orentlicher
4
 aligns himself with this position when he asserted thus: “If the law is unavailable to 
punish widespread brutality of the recent past, what lesson can be offered for the future? A complete failure of 
enforcement vitiates the authority of law itself, sapping its power to deter forbidden conduct.” He further stated 
that some moderate degree of tolerance may be granted where the offence is not of wide scale or less severe but 
not in circumstances where violations were endemic and on a massive scale. 
In the absence of justice, impunity reigns. The chances of vigilante justice also greatly increase: but if 
people see that the courts are dealing with perpetrators, they are less likely to take matters into their own hands.
5
 
Thus the faith of the citizenry can be reinvigorated through prosecution of rebel leaders in that a new paradigms 
shift can be created in these societies and bring to bear recognition of accountability for aggressors and violators 
of human rights.
6
 
Secondly, because an integral part of a democratic process involves reverence for the law as opposed to 
arbitrary administration of States, some advocates maintain that criminal trials are essential in order to muster 
popular support for the newly established government and strengthen the fragile democratic state.
7
 The 
                                                           
1  Lisa Laplante., “Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional justice Schemes.”   Journal of 
International law, Vol. 49, (2009) p. 915-917. 
2M. C. Bassiouni., “Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability.” Law and Contemporary 
Problems, Vol. 59, No. 9 (1996) p. 18. 
3 L. Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide,  Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008 p. 11.  
4 Diane Orentlicher., “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime” Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 100 (1991). 
5 E. Mobekk, ‘Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies – Approaches to Reconciliation’ in Ebnother, A. and Fluri, P. 
(eds), After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-Conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Local 
Ownership. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva. (2005). 
6. Kritz, Op. Cit. p. 127-152. 
7 Luc Huyse, ‘To Punish or Pardon: A Devil’s Choice’ in Christopher Joyner and M Cherif Bassiouni (eds), Reining in 
Impunity for International Crimes and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Proceedings of the Siracusa 
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consequences of non-prosecution would consist of a resort to frontier justice, a sense of skepticism in the new 
administration and its governmental system. Thirdly, advocates of criminal trials assert that prosecution can act 
as a public stage for truth seeking and fact finding. Here the victims can uncover the truth behind the conflicts, 
and individual roles in order to prevent a resurgence of violence. Lastly, proponents of criminal trials argue that 
holding perpetuators criminally accountable for their actions can provide the families and victims of heinous 
crimes with a feeling of closure and solace from suppressed or inhibited emotions since their plight has been 
dealt with and can conceivably be laid to rest, as against smoldering in apprehension of the next cycle of 
violence.1 
 
4.2 Criticisms of the Prosecutorial Model 
Opponent of the prosecutorial model of criminal trials for humanitarian atrocities committed within war 
torn States contends that these method would endanger the foundation of the newly established democratic State. 
In States where military forces hold onto considerable power after letting go of the political office, attempts to 
prosecute past abuses could arouse insurgency or internal disturbances that may weaken the powers of the 
democratic government.2 
In addition, criminal trials can impede upon the process of State reconciliation as defenders of past 
government may be forced into political and social segregation thus creating a sect opposed to the new found 
democracy.
3
 Similarly, the impracticability much less unrealistic nature of prosecution should be considered 
because war torn States may not have the much needed resources or capacity to trial the perpetrators of these 
heinous crimes. Another impeding factor is the high costs associated with the investigation, and prosecution, 
which can cripple the economy of a transitional States recovering from violent conflict.  
Another impeding criticism of criminal trials is based on its proponents believe that uncovering the 
truth about past crimes and punishment of perpetrators through court room proceedings will help the victims 
start the healing process.4 In reality, the only truth possibly obtainable through the adversarial English common 
law judicial system and trial is that which establishes an accused person’s innocence of the crime or culpability.
5
 
In line with this view, opponents of prosecution maintain that the harsh nature of cross-examining the victims’ 
and their testifier could occasion a relapse of physiological trauma and pains with the likelihood of conflicting 
testimony thus damaging their case.
6
 
Furthermore, prosecutions could lead to a vindication of the past government, hence risking the new 
transitional government’s fragile democracy. Yet another criticism is based on claims that huge financial 
resources are required in order to have any legitimate trials, as ensuring due process rights of an accused person 
is a very expensive process. The consequence of any selective prosecution under this situation may ultimately 
lead to societal disregards for the tenets of the rule of law. Furthermore, instead of expending huge resources on 
criminal trials, critics argue that these resources be better channeled towards the development of social 
amenities, correction of social inequality and provision of basic healthcare and housing. The liberal view that 
criminal trials foster the superiority of Civil and Political Rights as above Economic and Social Rights could be 
principally based upon States engrossment with prosecution.  
  Opponents of prosecution have further denounced the Africanisation of criminal trials, maintaining that 
prosecutors of the International Criminal Court has restricted their investigation to the African continent as a 
result of global pressures from world powers and a desperate bid to avoid confrontation with them, thus making 
Africa a soft target.  The court has also been questioned why it has failed to investigate and prosecute 
perpetrators of heinous crimes anywhere else in the world notably Syria where grave breaches have been 
perpetuated by the parties to the conflicts.7 There is a risk that retributive justice in a post-conflict situation can 
become ‘victor’s justice’, in other words be more concerned with vengeance than justice. In the long-run, this 
can fuel a cycle of ongoing violence. There is also the danger that going after perpetrators will destabilise fragile 
peace settlements, undermine democracy and endanger reconciliation.
8
   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Conference, 17–21 September 1997 (1998) 79 -81. 
1 Lambourne, Wendy., “The Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation: Responding to Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda.” 
International Studies Association, 40th Annual Convention, Washington, DC, 16-20 February 1999 
2  Orentlicher, Op. Cit. p. 2537. 
3 Kristin Henrard., “The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of Individual Criminal 
Responsibility at International Law.” DCL Journal of International Law, Vol. 8  (1999) 8 p. 595, 635. 
4 Payam Akhavan. "Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes 
Tribunal." Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 20, No.4 (1998) p. 737-816. 
5  Jennifer J. Llewellyn., Robert Howse. “Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission” University of Toronto Law Journal vol. 49, No. 3 (1999) p. 355-363. 
6 Ibid. 
7 D. Bosco, “Why Is the International Criminal Court Picking Only on Africa?” Washington Post, March 29, 2013. 
8  Bloomfield, D. et al. (eds) Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Policy Summary. IDEA, Stockholm, 2003 
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However, the degree of political uncertainty that marks most African reconciliation processes is of a 
grave disposition and as such, even the most ardent supporter of criminal trials acknowledges the necessity to 
ensure that juridical actions against aggressors does not reinstate armed conflicts in the country. The 
investigative powers of the ICC can be suspended whilst a duration of one year elapse, such suspension as 
approved by the UN SC.
1
 This procedure of deferment of prosecution is closely adopted or followed by the UN 
Securtiy Council in conflict situations where the maintenance of peace and stability is foremost and of utmost 
priority as against prosecution.  Furthermore, the interest of justice is a determining factor to guide a prosecutor 
as he is duty bound,2 to discontinue investigations or suspend prosecution where there is likelihood of such 
investigations jeopardizing or impeding a fragile peace process.  
 
4.3  Rationale for Amnesties 
Mallinder,3 puts forward the argument that the challenges of unraveling the whole truth through the 
instrument of courts present itself as a cardinal rationale behind amnesty legislations. This stands is based upon 
the fact that it is practically impossible to put up all perpetrators of heinous crimes in the dock, thus resort is had 
to amnesty, which are designed in ways that are  legal and lawful, using mutually agreed peace accord, rather 
than unlawfully as a result of the collapse of a countries judicial system as well as protective institutions namely 
the army as well as police, responsible to secure lives, as well as property and sustaining peace and stability 
within the country. Boraine,
4
 is trouble by the lengthy duration associated with the dispensation of legal justice 
within the court’s system, as well as the legal technicalities encountered during document tendering and cross 
examination processes, hindering the securement of a guilty verdict. Due to the forgoing trend, many war-torn 
States would be compelled to forgo trials, as a result of which a great number of perpetrators would be “left off 
the hock” which is relatively worrisome to the victims clamoring for legal redress.  The issue of dilapidated or 
destroyed court infrastructures, as well as the monetary capital required to set up a special court, and cost 
implications associated with the payment of sitting allowances to judicial officers is another issue for upmost 
concern in post-conflict settings. Freeman,
5
 claims that focusing on peace either through amnesty during the 
early post-reconstruction stages in the life of a divided society should in no way be taken to depict victims’ rights 
to legal redress as second placed. Justifying his position, the erudite scholar lays hold to the works of Moses 
Okello
6
 who maintains that,  
“The rationale for a peace first, justice later position is quite simple; it is a matter of sequencing. 
And, sequencing should be distinguished from prioritisation. If the preferred sequencing is peace 
followed by justice, this in no way signals that justice is a lower priority than peace, quite the 
opposite.  In fact whichever way you look at it, trying to ensure that the environment is 
conducive for a comprehensive pursuit of justice (i.e., that a peace deal has been struck, civilian 
authorities are back in place, clan structures responsible for traditional justice have re-grouped 
after decades of forcible dispersal, people are no longer living hand to mouth and are therefore 
better able to pursue justice for themselves) is definitive proof that you want real justice to be 
done.”  
For instance, Kofi Annan the erstwhile Secretary-General
7
 noted on this subject of discus that: “If we 
insist, at all times and in all places, on punishing those who are guilty of extreme violations of human rights, it 
may be difficult or even impossible to stop the bloodshed and save innocent civilians. If we always and 
everywhere insist on uncompromising standards of justice, a delicate peace may not survive.”  
Kofi Annan concludes thus, “But if we ignore the demands of justice simply to secure agreement, the 
foundations of that agreement will be fragile, and we will set bad precedents.”8 
The forgoing stands demonstrates the dilemma on the issue of amnesty, which as such no tentative 
agreement has been brought to bear, hence the debates linger on between criminal trial advocating prosecution 
and persons emphasizing reconciliations with the instrumentality of amnesty. This argument was employed by 
the Courts in South Africa, hence legitimizing broad spectrum amnesty awarded through the 1995 Act.9 10 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/policy_summary.pdf 
1 This is provided for under Art. 16 of the Rome Statute. 
2 See. Art. 53 (1) of the Statute 
3 Mallinder. Op. Cit. p.41-68. 
4 Boraine. Op. Cit. p.24. 
5 Freeman. Op. Cit p.19. 
6 Moses Chrispus Okello., “The False Polarisation of Peace and Justice” in Uganda Expert paper Justice in Situations of 
Ongoing Conflict, International Conference on Peace and Justice, 25th -27th June, (2007) Nuremberg, Germany 
7 UN Doc. S/PV.4833 (2003): p.3. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Promotion of national unity and reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.   
10
 Judge Mahomed found that “but for a mechanism for amnesty, the ‘historic bridge’ [the negotiated 
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decision however, has been condemned by many for failing to adhere with customary law rules that prescribe 
criminal trials of humanitarian crimes, more so proofs exist to show that amnesty in exchange for truth as 
employed during the transitional defunct Apartheid, to the Nelson Mandella led democratic administration of 
1994, averted outburst of a full scale internal armed conflict in South Africa. In recent times, a desperate bid to 
end rebel insurgency has prompted the UN to show solidarity towards amnesty grants for grave breaches.
1
  
 
4.4 Criticisms of the amnesty model 
The critics of the amnesty model based their criticisms upon the stands that courtroom trials exist as 
best models towards achieving criminal responsibility and fairness for the crimes of perpetrators. The deterrence 
theory presents itself as another rationale upon which amnesty should not be granted, in order to reinforce and 
secure reverence for the rule of law, as lack of punishment promotes skepticism as well as further doubts on 
governmental systems. On the whole, this argument reveals social and legal constraints as precautionary in 
nature and thus measures of securing responsibility. Bassiouni,
 2
 declared thus “accountability mechanisms 
appear to be solely punitive, but they are also preventive through enhancing commonly shared values and 
through deterrence as establishing respect for the rule of law is fundamental to achieving a durable peace in the 
aftermath of conflict, and to the effective protection of human rights.” The last argument against amnesty laws is 
that holding perpetrators accountable are crucial to create a “human rights culture” thus building the platform 
towards unending reconciliation. The reason as stated by Bassiouni being thus “a society is not reconciled with 
its violent past unless it works toward the creation of a culture of respect for fundamental human rights.” 
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The steps needed firstly in the desire for the attainment of a balanced framework between the grant of 
amnesties and preservation of victims’ rights within war-torn societies, undergoing the process of reconstruction 
as a result of violent hostilities, would primarily entail the enactment of amnesty laws by way of an elective 
process. Through this process, an injured as well as traumatized victims, would partake in the early deliberation 
phase, that seeks to determine what possible best approach to be followed by war-torn States following violent 
conflict and unwholesome atrocities, hence promoting a sense of moral justification, and desire for the grant of 
amnesty by the victims. Secondly, victims should be facilitated with unrestricted accessibility to unbiased facts, 
reports and opinions surrounding the proposed amnesties, which on the one hand aid them measure satisfactory 
opportunity costs including plausible gains to be derived through amnesty laws. Thirdly, peculiarity of each 
conflict situation should be carefully considered and the needs of victims’ wants should favour grant of amnesty. 
In countries in which the hostilities are widespread, victims’ may chose to concede to non-prosecution of 
violators, thus accepting amnesties as a result of the value they place on peace over justice. Here, victims’ may 
very well be better off if stability of prioritized over retributive justice, if that justice might ignite a new outburst 
of violence. Amnesty that does not receive the support of the victims’ should not be recognized as legitimate.  
Fourthly, the amnesty laws should be tailored to hold the perpetrators for which it was created to cover, 
answerable to the victims in respect of the heinous acts they committed. This is feasible through the inclusion of 
non-legal approach of accountability, to include truth commission, as well as non criminal penalties. Thus 
encouraging the practice of criminal responsibilities and at the same time strengthening and preventing arbitrary 
abuse of powers by government officials.  These commissions in most cases would ordinarily assist war victims 
in gathering information’s and answers to questions most desired by the sufferer to include: the present status of 
family members befallen by the conflict, possibilities of rescue or in other instances, the revelation of individual 
identify of perpetrators holding their love ones to ransom including their demands. On a precautionary basis, 
they could expound upon the root cause of the violent crimes, and also work out modalities to avert future 
resurgence of similar conflicts.  
In essence, those seeking amnesty must publicly admit of his or her acts whilst asking for clemency 
through the victims. Accountability measures such as these would afford certain benefit generally affiliated to 
criminal trial. Fifthly, amnesty legislations or rules should incorporate measures to ensure that perpetrators 
receiving amnesty will not commit future human rights abuses through the dismantling of rebel groups, 
demanding a return of arms by the rebels, compelling them to divulge private or sensitive knowledge 
surrounding the mode and style of operations, command structures and leadership rankings and on the whole 
ensuring and enforcing criminal sanctions against any rebel found to violate the stipulated amnesty conditions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
transition to democratic rule] itself might never have been erected.”   
1 For example, in 1993 the United Nations gave its full support to the Governors Island Agreement which granted full 
amnesty to members of General Cedras’ and Brigadier General Biamby’s military regime accused of committing crimes 
against humanity in Haiti from 1990-1994. The Security Council described the Agreement as “the only valid framework for 
resolving the crisis in Haiti”. Statement of the President of the 
Security Council, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 329th metg., at 26, UN Doc. S/INF/49 (1993).  
2 Bassiouni. Op. Cit p.51. 
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The gains to be derived by these actions could be increased through the support of Ecowas peacekeeping forces, 
engage solely for purposes of monitoring and enforcing criminal exoneration under the amnesty package.  
Sixthly, perpetrators whose atrocities amount to severe acts of grave breaches under humanitarian law 
rules, must where feasible be excluded from peace accords, but for the majority of combatants who were 
basically acting under the command and instructions of a superior and as such not bearing any specific criminal 
liability for the most serious humanitarian offence, can lawfully be amnestied and reintegrated into the 
community.  
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